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Cryptocurrency and the SEC: How a Piecemeal
Approach to Regulating New Technology Selectively
Stifles Innovation
ADAM J. KUEGLER
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently took steps to regulate
certain forms of cryptocurrency as substitute securities. However, the SEC has not
provided clear guidance regarding which forms of cryptocurrency it deems worthy
of regulation. This creates a dilemma. While some cryptocurrencies, like those
involved in capital-raising via initial coin offerings (ICOs), do indeed seem like
securities, others do not. For example, J.P. Morgan is developing a cryptocurrency
that appears to be more like fiat currency than a security. This Note discusses how
the SEC recently convinced a federal judge that certain ICO-related
cryptocurrencies can be considered securities under the Howey test, as well as how
the major questions doctrine—which asserts that issues of major importance should
not be left to the discretion of federal agencies absent clear congressional
guidance—relates to the topic of cryptocurrency regulation. Furthermore, this Note
discusses why it is undesirable that the SEC is regulating cryptocurrency without
clear guidance from Congress regarding which cryptocurrencies the Commission
has the authority to regulate. Because cryptocurrency is such a rapidly developing
field, the gray area between forms of cryptocurrency that seem to be securities and
those that do not will only become more complex. As a result, piecemeal
cryptocurrency regulation will continue to deprive innovators of sufficient guidance
regarding issues such as whether their cryptocurrency must be registered with the
SEC. Ultimately, this Note argues that the regulation of cryptocurrency—as a
developing technology—is a “major question,” and thus Congress should authorize
a new commission or sub-agency that can adequately address this varied and
everchanging field.
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Cryptocurrency and the SEC: How a Piecemeal
Approach to Regulating New Technology Selectively
Stifles Innovation
ADAM J. KUEGLER *
INTRODUCTION
In recent months, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”
or the “Commission”) has inserted itself into cryptocurrency regulation in
various ways. First, the SEC fined three individuals involved in managing a
hedge fund that falsely advertised the fund as the first regulated firm of its
kind to focus on cryptocurrency.1 Second, the Commission fined a
cryptocurrency firm for not registering as a brokerage firm.2 Finally, in the
same month, a federal judge ruled for the first time that initial coin offerings
(ICOs) could be the subject of securities laws.3 Yet, the lines that the SEC
*
J.D. 2020, University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A. 2017, University of Connecticut, Storrs.
Special thanks to Professor Kiel Brennan-Marquez for his outstanding advising throughout the process
of writing this Note, and to Professor Jennifer Taub for her review and comments from a securities law
perspective. Thanks also to the superb staff of the Connecticut Law Review for reviewing and editing this
Note. Finally, a sincere thank you to my family, friends, and loved ones, especially my parents and my
brother, Zachary, for their support throughout my law school endeavors.
1
Dave Michaels, SEC Takes First Action Against Hedge Fund Over Cryptocurrency Investments,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2018, 3:48 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-takes-first-action-againsthedge-fund-over-cryptocurrency-investments-1536688661. The Commission charged the hedge fund
with violations of sections 5(a), 5(c), and 17(a)(2) of the Securities Act, section 7(a) of the Investment
Company Act, and section 206(4) of the Advisers Act, along with corresponding Rule 206(4)-8. Crypto
Asset
Mgmt.,
LP,
Securities
Act
Release
No.
10544
(Sept.
11,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10544.pdf. Section 5(a) prohibits the sale of unregistered
securities through interstate commerce or the mail. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2012). Section 5(c) prohibits
offering to sell unregistered securities through interstate commerce or the mail. § 77e(c). Section 17(a)(2)
prohibits “any person in the offer or sale of any securities” from “obtain[ing] money or property by means
of any untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made . . . not misleading.” § 77q(a)(2). Section 7(a) prohibits investment companies
that are not registered with the SEC from “engag[ing] in any business in interstate commerce.” § 80-7(a).
Finally, Rule 206(4)-8 prohibits untrue statements or omissions of material facts by investment advisers
“to any investor or prospective investor in [a] pooled investment vehicle.” 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8
(2019). The SEC fined the hedge fund $200,000. Crypto Asset Mgmt., LP, Securities Act Release No.
10544, supra, at 5.
2
Michaels, supra note 1.
3
Alexander Osipovich, Judge Lets Cryptocurrency Fraud Case Go Forward, In Win for SEC,
WALL ST. J. (Sept. 11, 2018, 6:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/judge-lets-cryptocurrency-fraudcase-go-forward-in-win-for-sec-1536704792. An ICO occurs when “a firm creates a new cryptocurrency
and sells it to investors to raise money.” Id. The federal judge did not go so far as to resolve the question
of whether the cryptocurrencies in that case were securities, as his ruling “only settled the question of
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and the federal judge have set are far from bright. As a reporter for the Wall
Street Journal noted, “[t]he SEC didn’t reveal which tokens or
cryptocurrencies were implicated [in two of the cases discussed above],
making it impossible to tell which digital coins the regulator considers to be
securities.”4 One of the firms penalized by the SEC cited this uncertainty as
the reason for closing its doors, stating that its shutdown was “due to the
ever changing regulatory landscape of cryptocurrency space in our
jurisdiction.”5
Cryptocurrency and ICOs represent an unresolved area of federal
regulation. ICOs are devices for raising capital.6 Put simply, when a firm
carries out an ICO, it “creates a new cryptocurrency and sells it to investors
to raise money.”7 ICOs differ from traditional initial public offerings (IPOs)
in that the purchaser in an ICO does not receive equity in a company.8
whether [the] case would go to trial.” Id. Rather, the judge found that “the Indictment alleges sufficient
facts that, if proven at trial, could lead a reasonable jury to find that [the cryptocurrencies] constituted
‘investment contracts.’” Memorandum & Order at *10, United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647
(RJD), 2018 WL 4346339 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), ECF No. 37 (slip copy) [hereinafter Zaslavaskiy
Memorandum & Order].
4
Michaels, supra note 1; see also Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin
Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/publicstatement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11#_ftnref6 (“It has been asserted that cryptocurrencies are not
securities and that the offer and sale of cryptocurrencies are beyond the SEC’s jurisdiction. Whether that
assertion proves correct with respect to any digital asset that is labeled as a cryptocurrency will depend
on the characteristics and use of that particular asset.”). More recently, the SEC has offered additional
guidance regarding how cryptocurrencies may be classified as securities. See Framework for “Investment
SEC.
&
EXCHANGE
COMM’N,
Contract”
Analysis
of
Digital
Assets,
U.S.
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets (last updated Apr.
3, 2019) (providing “a framework for analyzing whether a digital asset has the characteristics of one
particular type of security–an ‘investment contract’”). However, while this guidance is instructive, it still
leaves uncertainty. The SEC cautions:
These factors are not intended to be exhaustive in evaluating whether a digital asset is
an investment contract or any other type of security, and no single factor is
determinative; rather, we are providing them to assist those engaging in the offer, sale,
or distribution of a digital asset, and their counsel, as they consider these issues. We
encourage market participants to seek the advice of securities counsel and engage with
the Staff through www.sec.gov/finhub.
Id.

5

Michaels, supra note 1.
Zachary Missan, Note, The SEC and Initial Coin Offerings: How Securities Laws Affect ICOs, 37
B.U. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 85, 85 (2017); Osipovich, supra note 3.
7
Osipovich, supra note 3. For further background on ICOs, see Arjun Kharpal, Tokenization: The
World of ICOs, CNBC (July 16, 2018, 2:09 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/13/initial-coinoffering-ico-what-are-they-how-do-they-work.html; Joon Ian Wong, Ethereum Unleashed the “Initial
Coin Offering” Craze, But It Can’t Handle Its Insane Success, QUARTZ (June 15, 2017),
https://qz.com/1004892/the-bancor-ico-just-raised-153-million-on-ethereum-in-three-hours/. See also
ICOs Explained: 5 Examples of Successful Coin Offerings, MEDIUM (Apr. 23, 2018),
https://medium.com/boosto/icos-explained-5-examples-of-successful-coin-offerings-2ddcb780ef58
(providing examples of other ICOs).
8
Kharpal, supra note 7.
6
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Rather, the purchaser hopes: (a) to be able to use the cryptocurrency on a
product to be created in the future, and/or (b) that the value of the coin itself
will increase so that the investor can profit by trading it.9 In 2017, initial coin
offerings became extremely popular because firms saw them as a method of
bypassing the regulatory and fee structure associated with initial public
offerings.10
The SEC, however, remains “wary” of ICOs.11 In reference to ICOs, the
Commission issued a report in July 2017 “in order to stress that the U.S.
federal securities law may apply to various activities, including distributed
ledger technology, depending on the particular facts and circumstances,
without regard to the form of the organization or technology used to
effectuate a particular offer or sale.”12 Still, from January through June
2018—months after the SEC issued the report—firms raised approximately
$12 billion through ICOs.13 Following the SEC’s July 2017 Report, some
cryptocurrency companies have attempted to offer cryptocurrencies in
compliance with the registration requirements of section 5 of the Securities
Act or its exemptions. For example, one company—Filecoin—raised more
than $257 million through an offering under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D,
which allows general solicitation for offerings that involve sales exclusively
to accredited investors.14
Cryptocurrency regulation is largely uncharted legal territory. The first
time a federal judge ruled that ICOs could be the subject of SEC regulation
was in September 2018 in the case of United States v. Zaslavskiy.15 Notably,
a court in another federal district has already cited Zaslavskiy in finding that
a plaintiff had a private cause of action against a corporation that had not
registered its cryptocurrency as a security.16 As Zaslavskiy and other similar
cases gain traction and rise through the federal court system, the SEC’s
toughest test in cryptocurrency regulation—a legal battle before the
Supreme Court—could be in the making.
9

Id.
Osipovich, supra note 3.
11
Id.
12
See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
The
DAO,
Exchange
Act
Release
No.
81207,
at
10
(July
25,
2017),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf [hereinafter July 2017 SEC Report of
Investigation].
13
Osipovich, supra note 3.
14
Michael Mendelson, From Initial Coin Offerings to Security Tokens: A U.S. Federal Securities
Law Analysis, 22 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 52, 85 (2019) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2018) and 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.905 (2018)).
15
See Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *10 (ruling that a jury could find that the
cryptocurrencies in this case were “investment contracts”); Osipovich, supra note 3 (“Regulators scored
a victory in their crackdown on cryptocurrency crimes as a judge ruled that initial coin offerings are
subject to U.S. securities-fraud laws.”).
16
Solis v. Latium Network, Inc., No. 18-10255 (SDW) (SCM), 2018 WL 6445543, at *4–6 (D.N.J.
Dec. 10, 2018).
10
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As a subject of federal regulation, cryptocurrency provides an important
opportunity for analysis and reflection. Its current value stems from the fact
that it is so new that the Federal Government has not completely solidified
its regulatory approach.17 Meanwhile, the Supreme Court might decide to
drastically change the Chevron doctrine18 and restrict the power of federal
agencies to act without express statutory authority. This possibility became
especially plausible with the confirmation of Justice Brett Kavanaugh to the
Supreme Court in 2018, replacing Justice Anthony Kennedy.19 Justice
Kennedy frequently served as the swing vote in administrative law cases.20
Justice Kavanaugh, who has criticized the Chevron doctrine,21 may push the
Court towards ending the Chevron doctrine as we know it. This could
severely curtail the SEC’s power to regulate cryptocurrency absent clear
congressional authorization to do so.
This Note does not take a position on the broad question of whether the
Supreme Court should fundamentally transform Chevron. Rather, this Note
argues more narrowly that there are legitimate and persuasive doctrinal and
policy reasons for why the SEC should not be involved in regulating
cryptocurrency at this time. This reasoning is based on three main premises.
First, cryptocurrency is an everchanging subject that will likely continue to
evolve into myriad uses as it rapidly becomes a major part of the U.S.
economy. Thus, cryptocurrency regulation falls within the major questions
doctrine, which directs that “agencies need clear authorization from
Congress to pass regulations with major economic and political
significance.”22 The doctrine further advises courts against deferring to “an
agency’s interpretation of a statutory provision . . . where the interpretive
17

Osipovich, supra note 3 (describing how the SEC “has said many ICOs are unregistered securities
offerings, making them potentially illegal, and warned that many could be fraudulent” (emphasis added)).
18
See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984) (setting
out the process by which courts should analyze statutory interpretations by federal agencies).
19
Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Kavanaugh Is Sworn In After Close Confirmation Vote in Senate, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/06/us/politics/brett-kavanaugh-supremecourt.html.
20
ANDREW NOLAN & CAITLAIN DEVEREAUX LEWIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45293, JUDGE
BRETT M. KAVANAUGH: HIS JURISPRUDENCE AND POTENTIAL IMPACT ON THE SUPREME COURT 44
(2018) [hereinafter CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT].
21
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2151 (2016)
[hereinafter Fixing Statutory Interpretation] (arguing that the Chevron doctrine allows a deviation from
the best reading of a statute).
22
CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 51. For scholarly literature defining the major
questions doctrine in terms of economic and political significance, see, for example, Blake Emerson,
Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory
Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2022 (2018); Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions About the
“Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 479 (2016); Nathan Richardson,
Keeping Big Cases from Making Bad Law: The Resurgent “Major Questions” Doctrine, 49 CONN. L.
REV. 355, 358 (2016); Marla D. Tortorice, Nondelegation and the Major Questions Doctrine: Displacing
Interpretive Power, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 1075, 1102–03 (2019).
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question could effectuate an enormous and transformative expansion of the
agency’s regulatory authority.”23 The second premise relates to policy
considerations. Due to the rapid evolution of cryptocurrency, cryptocurrency
regulation requires a comprehensive approach. To allow one federal agency,
such as the SEC, to regulate one aspect of cryptocurrency allows for a
piecemeal approach that may lead to obscure results and stifle innovation.
The third and final premise relates to distributive justice. Put simply, smaller
cryptocurrency companies will be disproportionately affected by regulatory
uncertainty.
Cryptocurrency regulation is a complex issue. It requires balancing the
hardships and barriers to entry that uncertain regulation creates, on the one
hand, with adequately addressing the need to protect cryptocurrency
consumers and investors, on the other. While the observation that smaller
companies find it more difficult to comply with regulations than larger
companies is generally true—that is, it is not a dynamic unique to
cryptocurrency—this Note’s argument is more specific. Namely, regulatory
uncertainty is especially detrimental to young industries that rely on
emerging, rapidly developing technologies, because these industries are
more susceptible than mature industries to the possibility that smaller
companies will be left behind by regulatory uncertainty. In other words, this
Note does not focus on how general costs of compliance disproportionately
affect smaller companies. Rather, it argues that smaller companies will be
left behind because they will not know whether they have to comply with
specific regulations—or even which agencies are responsible for regulating
them. Technologies like cryptocurrency, being both new and poorly
understood, run the risk of creating a piecemeal regulatory system that is
incapable of keeping up with innovation. This only leads to more uncertainty
and, subsequently, more inequality.
Ultimately, this Note argues that Congress should authorize a new
federal commission or a sub-agency within a federal agency—perhaps even
the SEC—to deal exclusively with cryptocurrency. This, of course, is a bold
proposal. However, cryptocurrency is not only a topic of major consequence,
but it also spans many areas of the technological and financial landscape.
ICOs have the potential to revolutionize investing practices. In fact, they are
already having a major effect.24 Meanwhile, cryptocurrency could
drastically change the ways in which corporations and banks move money
23

Leske, supra note 22, at 480. See also Richardson, supra note 22, at 358 (noting that the major
questions doctrine “claws back interpretive authority for judges in certain ‘extraordinary’ cases” and that
“it says that when the legal stakes are sufficiently high, agency interpretations of law carry little or no
weight, contrary to the standard rule in everyday cases where those interpretations are often
determinative” (citation omitted)).
24
See Osipovich, supra note 3 (noting that entities used ICOs to raise $12 billion in the first half of
2018).
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around the world.25 The diversity in the ways in which cryptocurrency can
be used results in complex legal and regulatory issues. Through a single
regulatory agency or sub-agency that deals exclusively with cryptocurrency,
the Federal Government can be prepared to deal with new cryptocurrency
devices as they arise. In addition, by adopting a unified channel for
regulation, the Federal Government can facilitate innovation, which is
extremely important to the financial sector and other industries.
Importantly, this Note does not argue that it is completely nonsensical
for certain federal agencies, including the SEC, to assert jurisdiction over
certain aspects of cryptocurrency. Nor does this Note necessarily argue for
more cryptocurrency regulation or less cryptocurrency regulation. Rather,
this Note argues for smarter cryptocurrency regulation. It is understandable
that some federal agencies see aspects of cryptocurrency as falling within
their jurisdiction. It follows that the proper place for cryptocurrency
regulation might be a sub-agency within an existing federal agency, such as
the Federal Trade Commission. But development in cryptocurrency is
creating gray areas—areas within the field that do not neatly fit within the
jurisdiction of any single, currently-existing federal agency. As this Note
discusses, when one or multiple ill-suited agencies attempt to deal with a
rapidly changing innovative technology, the result is inefficiency—and
uncertainty—in regulation. This uncertainty can be cured, at least in part, by
the congressional authorization of a single regulator—a “one stop shop” for
cryptocurrency innovators—to determine the appropriate methods of
cryptocurrency regulation as the field develops.
This Note introduces the problem, in Part I, through a careful analysis
of United States v. Zaslavskiy, a 2018 case holding that cryptocurrency could
be the subject of federal securities regulation. Next, Part II focuses on the
Chevron doctrine, the major questions doctrine, and why these doctrines
could matter to an eventual U.S. Supreme Court decision addressing
cryptocurrency regulation. Part III discusses why an agency or sub-agency
focused exclusively on cryptocurrency would be preferable to piecemeal
regulation involving the SEC and other federal agencies. Finally, the Note
ends with some concluding thoughts.
I. SECURITIES REGULATION, SECURITIES CASE LAW, AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO CRYPTOCURRENCY: THE ZASLAVSKIY CASE
A review of recent cryptocurrency case law, foundational securities
cases, and SEC regulations provides insight into how the Commission is
asserting itself into cryptocurrency regulation and how courts are reacting.
25

See J.P. Morgan Creates Digital Coin for Payments, J.P. MORGAN (Feb. 14, 2019),
https://www.jpmorgan.com/global/news/digital-coin-payments [hereinafter J.P. Morgan JPM Coin
Announcement] (describing J.P. Morgan’s creation of its own cryptocurrency, “JPM Coin”).
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Judge Raymond J. Dearie’s recent memorandum and order in United States
v. Zaslavskiy26 is a natural starting point. It both exemplifies the SEC’s
position on cryptocurrency and provides a review of relevant securities cases
from SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.27 through the present day.28
In Zaslavskiy, the defendant allegedly collected money from investors
under the false premise that his cryptocurrencies, “REcoin” and “Diamond,”
were backed by real estate and diamonds, respectively.29 He promised that
those who invested in REcoin “could change their money into a ‘more stable
and secure investment: real estate,’ which ‘grows in value.’”30 He also stated
that the proceeds of REcoin were “invest[ed] . . . into global real estate.”31
As for Diamond, the defendant falsely claimed that the cryptocurrency was
hedged by actual diamonds and that through Diamond’s efforts, the
cryptocurrency could be excepted to grow by at least ten or fifteen percent
each year. 32
The Government charged Zaslavskiy with securities fraud under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and SEC Rule 10b-5.33
The Government argued that investments in the cryptocurrencies that the
defendant peddled were “investment contracts” within the definitions for
securities in the Exchange Act and the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities
Act).34 The defendant moved to dismiss the charges against him based in
part on the argument that his cryptocurrencies did not qualify as securities.35
Zaslavskiy claimed that his supposed cryptocurrencies were currency rather
than “investment vehicles,” and as a result, they should be excluded from
the federal law definitions of securities.36 He also argued that the
cryptocurrencies did not fall under the Howey definition of an investment
contract because: (1) they involved purchases that did not include money;37
(2) there was neither horizontal nor strict vertical commonality because the
government alleged neither the pooling of assets nor that the fortunes of the
purchasers depended on the fortunes of the defendants;38 and (3) purchaser

26

Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3.
328 U.S. 293 (1946).
28
See Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *6–17 (reviewing securities case law as
it relates to the cryptocurrencies in Zaslavskiy).
29
Id. at *2–3.
30
Id. at *3 (citations omitted).
31
Id. (alteration in original).
32
Id. at *4 (citations omitted).
33
Id. at *1–2.
34
Id.
35
Id. at *1.
36
Memorandum of Law Supporting Maksim Zaslavkiy’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 11–14,
United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17-CR-0647 (RJD) (RER) (E.D.N.Y. 2018), ECF No. 27.
37
Id. at 15–16.
38
Id. at 16–17.
27
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profits did not depend on the efforts of the cryptocurrency promoters.39
Notably, the defendant argued that the “decentralized” nature of blockchain
is “resistant” to horizontal commonality.40 Furthermore, the defendant
argued that the “context” did not indicate that the cryptocurrencies were
investment contracts in part because “purchasers . . . did not purchase any
interest in a legal entity.”41
Judge Dearie of the Eastern District of New York ruled that a reasonable
jury could find the Government’s argument persuasive and consequently
consider the defendant’s cryptocurrencies to be investment contracts.42
However, the court stressed that “[w]hether a transaction or instrument
qualifies as an investment contract is a highly fact-specific inquiry.”43
Therefore, the court left to the jury the ultimate question of whether the
cryptocurrencies in this case amounted to securities. This case highlights
how the way in which a court interprets the definition of “securities” under
relevant securities laws and regulations is the predominant factor in
determining whether cryptocurrency can be regulated by federal securities
laws. The court concluded that if the jury found that the three prongs of the
Howey test were satisfied, then that jury could reasonably find that the
cryptocurrencies constituted securities.44 In its discussion of the three prongs
of the Howey test, the court provided useful insights regarding other cases
that have guided securities law jurisprudence since Howey.45
The first prong of the Howey test is whether “individuals invested money
(and other forms of payment) in order to participate in [the defendant’s]
schemes.”46 In discussing this prong, the court cited persuasive authority to
stress the importance of an investment to the definition of a security. First,
the court cited SEC v. SG Ltd.,47 which stated that for the first Howey prong,
“[t]he determining factor is whether an investor ‘chose to give up a specific
consideration in return for a separable financial interest with the
characteristics of a security.’”48 Next, the court cited SEC v. Brigadoon
Scotch Distributors, Ltd.,49 in which the Southern District of New York put
weight in evidence that the defendants advertised the money they sought as
39

Id. at 18–20.
Id. at 17.
41
Id. at 20.
42
Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *10.
43
Id. at *9 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551, 560 n.11 (1982)).
44
Id. at *10–16.
45
Id. at *6–17.
46
Id. at *10–11 (emphasis added) (citing Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300).
47
Id. (quoting SEC v. SG Ltd., 265 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2001)).
48
SG Ltd., 265 F.3d at 48.
49
Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *11 (citing SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib.,
Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288, 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
40
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an “investment.”50 Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the purposes
of this Note, Judge Dearie cast disfavor on the defendant’s argument that
those who paid for the cryptocurrency did so as an “exchange of one medium
of currency for another.”51 The judge pointed out that the indictment alleged
that the “exchange” was actually for “membership” in the cryptocurrency
“ventures.”52 This “exchange,” as this Note previously described, was
premised on the promise that the purchasers would receive interests in
diamond and real estate-backed tokens, which would purportedly increase
in value based on real estate investments and/or the growth of the
cryptocurrencies.53
Next, the court discussed the second prong of the Howey test: that the
cryptocurrency “constituted a ‘common enterprise.’”54 The court cited
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,55 which declared that
“the ‘touchstone’ of the Howey test ‘is the presence of an investment in a
common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to be
derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.’”56 Judge
Dearie stressed the necessity of “commonality” and noted that “horizontal
commonality” is enough to demonstrate a common enterprise—at least in
the Second Circuit.57 He described horizontal commonality as when assets
or funds are shared and each investor’s return depends on “the profitability
of the enterprise as a whole.”58 Judge Dearie found that the Government
could satisfy Howey’s second prong because the cryptocurrencies
purportedly relied on the pooling of funds for buying real estate and
diamonds and because the defendant promised the investors virtual pieces
of currency that were in proportion to their investment interest.59 The court
referenced how the courts in both Howey and SG Ltd. found significance in
the fact that investors were given “shares” or “capital units” that were
proportional to their interests in the respective enterprises.60 Notably, the
court stated that evidence that the defendant promised pieces of virtual
currency to investors did not detract from the allegation that he had pooled
assets as part of his scheme.61
50

Brigadoon Scotch Distrib., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. at 1291.
Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (also
noting that the defendant made this argument “glibly”).
52
Id. (citations omitted).
53
Id. at *3–4.
54
Id. at *12 (citations omitted).
55
Id. (citing Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561 (1979)).
56
Daniel, 439 U.S. at 561 (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975)).
57
Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *12 (quoting Revak v. SEC Realty Corp., 18
F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1994)).
58
Id. at *13 (quoting Revak, 18 F.3d at 87).
59
Id. (quoting Revak, 18 F.3d at 87–88).
60
Id. at *13–14 (citations omitted).
61
Id. at *14.
51

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 471

7/28/20 10:49 AM

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

1000

[Vol. 52:2

For the third prong of Howey, the court stated that in order to find the
defendant guilty of securities fraud, the jury would have to find that
“investors were led to expect profits in [the defendant’s cryptocurrencies] to
be derived solely from the managerial efforts of [the defendant] and his
co-conspirators, not any efforts of the investors themselves.”62 The court
cited SEC v. Edwards,63 which held that a key aspect of an investment
contract is “the presence of an investment in a common venture premised on
a reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others.”64 Relying on Edwards, Forman, and the SEC’s
July 2017 Report of Investigation, the court found that the “grow[th] in
value” that the defendant promised to investors qualified as profits for
purposes of the third prong of the Howey test.65 The court further reasoned
that investors “could have reasonably expected” that any profits they gained
would be “primarily” from the efforts of the defendant and his
co-conspirators rather than from the investors themselves.66 The court
gathered this from evidence that the defendant advertised having “the
soundest” investment strategies and from evidence that the investors did not
have any control over how the defendant used the investments he collected.67
Judge Dearie made this ruling—even though investors would purportedly
have the opportunity to trade their virtual coins for profit—because the
investors did not have oversight in the management of the pooled
investments of the cryptocurrencies.68
Finally, the Zaslavskiy court rejected the defendant’s argument that the
cryptocurrencies could not be securities because they were currency.69 The
court pointed out that no currency ever existed in this fraud case and cited
Edwards and Forman in emphasizing that the definition of security should
focus on substance and economic reality, rather than form.70 Judge Dearie
later referenced SEC v. Zandford in noting that “securities laws are meant to
be interpreted ‘flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purpose.’”71
Furthermore, he stated that the purpose of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5
is to prevent the exact conduct which the defendant allegedly committed—
the potentially fraudulent “use [of] the money of others on the promise of
62

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. (citing SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 395 (2004)).
64
Edwards, 540 U.S. at 395 (citation omitted).
65
Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *14–15 (citations omitted).
66
Id. at *15.
67
Id. at *15–16 (citations omitted).
68
Id.
69
Id. at *16–17 (citing, in part, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012), which precludes currency from being
a security if certain conditions are met).
70
Id. at *17 (citing SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) and United Hous. Found., Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 848 (1975)).
71
Id. at *19 (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002)).
63
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profits.”72 As such, the conduct that the Government charged in the
indictment fell within the purpose of the statute.73
This review of Zaslavskiy is important, not only because it was a
groundbreaking decision, but also because it demonstrates the cutting edge
of judicial decision making involving cryptocurrency and securities
regulation. It shows the arguments that the Federal Government, other
plaintiffs, and defendants in securities litigation might use in such conflicts,
and it illustrates the authorities that judges might cite in justifying their
decisions to include cryptocurrency and ICOs in the purview of securities
regulations. Finally, Zaslavskiy supplies an example of the type of case that
might come to the Supreme Court on appeal. It shows the type of reasoning
that the Supreme Court might need to reverse if it intends to curtail the ability
of the Federal Government to regulate cryptocurrency under securities
regulations.
Based on the way Judge Dearie described the cryptocurrencies in
Zaslavskiy, it may seem obvious that ICOs will always constitute securities.
Based on this assessment, some might argue that failing to classify such
cryptocurrencies as securities only serves to leave those seeking to raise
capital with a way to evade securities laws and thereby put investors at risk.
But this is hardly true of all cryptocurrency-based capital raises. Imagine,
for example, an ICO for a cryptocurrency that can only be used within a
specific network. As Attorney Michael Mendelson noted, certain “digital
tokens sold for use in established networks that only have utility within those
networks . . . might appear less likely to be considered securities” under the
Supreme Court’s holding in Forman.74 However, SEC Chairman Jay
Clayton stated that “[m]erely calling a token a ‘utility’ token or structuring
it to provide some utility does not prevent the token from being a security.”75
Attorney Mendelson concluded that “[h]istory will ultimately decide
whether the courts will follow Forman or Clayton in assessing whether the
token purchases are motivated by the desire to build and use a product or to
generate investment profits.”76
72

Id. at *21 (citation omitted).
Id.
74
Mendelson, supra note 14, at 78 (citing Forman, 421 U.S. at 838).
75
Id. at 78–79 (quoting Jay Clayton, Public Statement: Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial
Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-1211).
76
Id. at 79. It is important to note that Michael Mendelson came to the opposite conclusion from
this Note regarding the SEC’s regulation of cryptocurrency. Attorney Mendelson stated that “[t]he SEC
was right” to “lay[] down the law” and “declare[] its jurisdiction” over ICOs. Id. at 52. Attorney
Mendelson further declared that “[t]here is no doubt that the overwhelming majority of ICOs involve the
sale of securities and companies who ignore this conclusion do so at their own risk.” Id. Still, his work
offers support to a central premise of this Note. Importantly, Attorney Mendelson continued on to say:
“Yet the law of ICOs and digital token financing is by no means final or clear, and with little official
guidance to go on, startups are left to fend for themselves in a sea of self-declared experts.” Id.
73
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Thus, so-called “utility tokens” provide an example of how there is still
uncertainty regarding which cryptocurrencies must be registered with the
SEC, even when those cryptocurrencies involve ICOs. In fact, despite the
SEC’s assertion of authority over certain ICOs, it remains the case that
“companies must perform a thorough technical network analysis and an
equally thorough regulatory analysis to determine whether their tokens could
be considered a security.”77 Indeed, Commissioner Hester M. Pierce noted
in September 2018 that “the application of Howey to a particular ICO does
not answer every question.”78 Commissioner Pierce also noted: “Crypto
tokens are still evolving, and there are many people thinking through these
issues right now.”79
II. THE MAJOR QUESTIONS DOCTRINE AND CRYPTOCURRENCY
REGULATION
About thirty-five years ago, Chevron changed the way in which courts
assess the role of administrative agencies. In Chevron, the Supreme Court
directed that when reviewing an agency’s interpretation of a statute, courts
should first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.”80 If the answer is yes, then Congress’s “unambiguously
expressed intent” must prevail.81 However, if Congress has not spoken
directly to the matter, “the question for the court is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”82 The Court
further explained that where Congress has implicitly allowed regulatory
discretion to federal agencies on specific issues, “a court may not substitute
its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation
made by the administrator of an agency.”83 Yet, while the Chevron doctrine
allows federal agencies to exercise considerable discretion, another
doctrine—the “major questions doctrine”—provides a way to restrain them.
A. Major Questions Doctrine Precedent
The major questions doctrine insists that “agencies need clear
authorization from Congress to pass regulations with major economic and
political significance.”84 In Brown & Williamson, a case regarding tobacco
77

Id. at 54.
Id. at 82 (citing Hester Pierce, Wolves and Wolverines: Remarks at the University of Michigan
SEC.
&
EXCHANGE
COMM’N
(Sept.
24,
2018),
Law
School,
U.S.
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-092418).
79
Pierce, supra note 78.
80
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
81
Id. at 842–43.
82
Id. at 843.
83
Id. at 844.
84
CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 51 (footnote omitted).
78
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regulation, the Supreme Court stated that it “must be guided to a degree by
common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a
policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an
administrative agency.”85 The Court further asserted that there are
“extraordinary cases” in which “there may be reason to hesitate before
concluding that Congress has intended . . . an implicit delegation” of
authority to a federal agency.86
A review of major questions doctrine precedent reveals a few important
themes. First, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to defer to administrative
agencies on questions that carry political significance. For example, in
Brown & Williamson, the Court noted that “[o]wing to its unique place in
American history and society, tobacco has its own unique political
history.”87 The Court found importance in Congress’s “distinct regulatory
scheme for tobacco products” and its rejection of proposals to give the FDA
power over tobacco regulation.88 The Court ultimately decided not to defer
to the FDA’s statutory interpretation.89 Similarly, in a case involving the
Attorney General’s jurisdiction over the issue of physician-assisted suicide,
the Court stated that “[t]he importance of the issue of physician-assisted
suicide, which has been the subject of an earnest and profound debate across
the country, makes the oblique form of the [Attorney General’s] claimed
delegation all the more suspect.”90
Additionally, the Supreme Court has been hesitant to defer to federal
agencies in cases involving issues of major economic significance. In Brown
& Williamson, the Supreme Court observed that the FDA had “asserted
jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the
American economy.”91 In the recent case of Utility Air Regulatory Group v.
EPA, the Supreme Court quoted Brown & Williamson in finding that
“[w]hen an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded
power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American economy,’ we
typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism.”92
Furthermore, in MCI Telecommunications Corp., the Supreme Court
discussed the question of whether the Federal Communications Commission
85

FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
Id. at 159.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 159–60.
89
Id.
90
Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262, 267–68 (2006) (internal citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
91
Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159.
92
134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014) (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159). See also Indus.
Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 645 (1980) (“In the absence of a clear
mandate in the Act, it is unreasonable to assume that Congress intended to give the Secretary the
unprecedented power over American industry that would result from the Government’s view of §§ 3(8)
and 6(b)(5), coupled with OSHA’s cancer policy[.]”).
86
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(FCC) had the ability to eliminate rate-filing requirements under a statutory
provision that allowed it to “modify” such requirements.93 The Court found
that the FCC did not have such authority and noted that “an elimination of
the crucial provision of the statute for 40% [of the customers] of a major
sector of the industry is much too extensive to be considered a
‘modification.’”94 These cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has
hesitated to extend Chevron deference not only when the regulation would
affect a significant portion of the American economy, but also when the
regulation would affect an industry that constitutes a significant portion of
the American economy.
Furthermore, some lower courts have exhibited a willingness to invoke
the major questions doctrine in cases involving technological innovation.
For example, Judge O’Malley of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
recognized this theme in a recent concurring opinion regarding internet
regulation.95 Finding support in Supreme Court precedent, Judge O’Malley
wrote that “the responsibility lies with Congress to decide how best to
address these new developments in technology.”96 The two cases that Judge
O’Malley cited—Gottschalk and Microsoft Corp.—involved the
patentability of computer programming.97 In Gottschalk, the Supreme Court
opined that:
If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems
are raised which only committees of Congress can manage, for
broad powers of investigation are needed, including hearings
which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating
in this field entertain. The technological problems tendered in
the many briefs before us indicated to us that considered action
by the Congress is needed.98
Similarly, in Microsoft Corp., the Court stated that “[i]f the patent law
is to be adjusted better to account for the realities of software distribution,
the alteration should be made after focused legislative consideration, and not
by the Judiciary forecasting Congress’ likely disposition.”99 Such cases are
examples of a judicial desire for clear guidance from Congress when
agencies make policy that affects developing technologies, especially
computer programs and the internet.
93

MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994).
Id.
95
ClearCorrect Operating, LLC v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(O’Malley, J., concurring).
96
Id. (citing Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 458–59 (2007) and Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972)).
97
Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 458; Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71.
98
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 73.
99
Microsoft Corp., 550 U.S. at 458–59 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
94
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Major questions doctrine precedent could play an important role in how
the Supreme Court decides whether the SEC can regulate cryptocurrency.
The Court might decide that cryptocurrency regulation is a matter of major
economic, political, or technological importance and consequently restrict
the SEC from exercising jurisdiction over the field.
On a broader scale, the major questions doctrine is poised, going
forward, to play an increasingly prominent role in reshaping administrative
law. This is largely due to recent shifts in Supreme Court membership. In
2018, Justice Brett Kavanaugh replaced former Justice Anthony Kennedy.100
Justice Kavanaugh might be the swing vote on issues regarding the
regulatory power of federal agencies and, more specifically, agency power
to regulate cryptocurrency.101 In several cases heard during his time on the
Court, Justice Kennedy was the deciding vote in decisions involving the
Chevron doctrine.102 Just days before announcing that he would retire from
the Court, Justice Kennedy signaled that the Court should rethink its
approach to Chevron, a position that he seemed to think at least three of his
colleagues would support.103 Justice Kavanaugh has both voiced
disagreement with Chevron and indicated support for the major questions
doctrine. His influence might lead the Court to reexamine the Chevron
doctrine and, if not change it radically, at least rein in regulatory agencies
on issues of major importance.
B. The Potential Shift in Supreme Court Doctrine Applied to
Cryptocurrency Regulation
The definitions for “security” in both the Exchange Act and the
Securities Act list a variety of devices that could qualify as securities.104
These lists include devices like stocks, bonds, and put and call options.105 As
100

Stolberg, supra note 19.
CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 44 (noting that Justice Kennedy “often [found]
himself as a decisive vote in important administrative law cases during the Roberts Court era”).
102
Id.
103
Id. (citing Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring)) (also
noting that this “signals to some that the Court may be on the verge of recrafting foundational
administrative law doctrines”); see Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2120–21 (citing Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct.
2699, 2712–14 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312–28, 327
(2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); and Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149–58 (10th Cir.
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)) (“[W]hen deference is applied to other questions of statutory
interpretation, such as an agency’s interpretation of the statutory provisions that concern the scope of its
own authority, it is more troubling still. Given the concerns raised by some Members of this Court, it
seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron
and how courts have implemented that decision. The proper rules for interpreting statutes and
determining agency jurisdiction and substantive agency powers should accord with constitutional
separation-of-powers principles and the function and province of the Judiciary.”).
104
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012).
105
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
101
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this Note previously discussed, the Acts’ inclusion of “investment contracts”
in their definitions for securities has been used by a federal judge to allow
cryptocurrency to be the subject of federal securities regulations.106 But,
notably missing from the list of items that Congress explicitly stated could
qualify as securities is the word “cryptocurrency.” Justice Kavanaugh has
demonstrated a propensity to restrain the powers of federal agencies,
especially where there is no explicit guidance from Congress about how that
agency should act.107 Based on Justice Kavanaugh’s written opinions, it is
entirely possible that he would hold—and lead the Supreme Court to hold—
that, because the Exchange Act and the Securities Act do not specifically list
cryptocurrency within their “securities” definitions, cryptocurrency is not a
valid subject for securities regulation. If this view prevails, the SEC might
need to look to Congress for a more specific grant of authority over
cryptocurrency and ICOs. As a result, Justice Kavanaugh’s judicial
philosophy could have a drastic effect on the use of securities laws to
regulate cryptocurrency and ICOs.
Under existing administrative law, the question of whether
cryptocurrency qualifies as a security is subject to Chevron deference.
Hypothetically, in order to determine whether to defer to the SEC’s
interpretation of the Exchange Act and the Securities Act, courts should first
look to whether the definition for “security” as defined by federal law—or a
specific part of that definition—is clear or ambiguous. But under Justice
Kavanaugh’s proposal for modified Chevron analysis, courts should only
defer to agency interpretations when the statutory language in question
involves words like “reasonable,” “practicable,” “appropriate,” or
“feasible.”108 Notably, neither of the federal definitions for “security”
involve this type of language.109 Rather, these definitions involve what
Justice Kavanaugh would call, “specific statutory term[s] or phrase[s].”110
Thus, Justice Kavanaugh would likely try to determine the “best reading of
the statutory text” of the definitions.111 It is unlikely, under that standard,
that the definition sections of federal securities statutes include
cryptocurrency. Not only do they fail to list “cryptocurrency” as a security,
but the definition in the Exchange Act specifically excludes “currency or
106

See supra Part I (discussing Judge Dearie’s memorandum and order in Zaslavskiy).
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting);
Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, No. 09-1322, 2012 WL 6621785, at *14 (D.C. Cir. Dec.
20, 2012) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). See also Jacob Gershman, Brett
Kavanaugh Has Shown Deep Skepticism of Regulatory State, WALL ST. J. (July 9, 2018, 11:14 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/nominee-has-shown-deep-skepticism-of-regulatory-state-1531186402
(“Judge Kavanaugh praised the late Justice Antonin Scalia for putting more focus on the text of statutes—
and the meaning of words and phrases in the law—when evaluating regulations.”).
108
Fixing Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at 2153.
109
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10); 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1).
110
Fixing Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at 2154.
111
Id.
107
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any note.”112 While the Federal Government has tried to define
cryptocurrencies as securities in specific instances,113 it is at best unclear
whether cryptocurrencies as a whole qualify as securities. As such, since
Justice Kavanaugh has written that in administrative law cases, it is often
most important to look to “the precise wording of the statutory text,”114 he
would likely be hesitant to insert cryptocurrency into the federal definitions
of securities.
Even under the Supreme Court’s current Chevron analysis framework,
Justice Kavanaugh would be unlikely to include cryptocurrency in the
definitions of “security” under federal law. First, given his propensity to find
statutes clear rather than ambiguous,115 Justice Kavanaugh might simply find
that the definitions clearly do not include cryptocurrencies. But, even if he
were to find the Acts ambiguous, Justice Kavanaugh would still be unlikely
to find that the SEC has the power to regulate cryptocurrency. This is due to
the potential for Justice Kavanaugh to apply the major questions doctrine.
There are plenty of reasons to argue that cryptocurrency regulation is of
“major economic and political significance.”116 Not only are ICOs being
utilized to raise billions of dollars,117 but also, as will be discussed at greater
length in Part III of this Note,118 a “major U.S. bank” has created a
cryptocurrency for potential use in connection with its wholesale payments
business that “moves . . . $6 trillion around the world every day.”119 The
implications of developments like these may well place cryptocurrency
regulation into the same league as “regulating cigarettes” and “eliminating
telecommunications rate-filing requirements”120 for Justice Kavanaugh.
Even when following the traditional Chevron analysis, Justice Kavanaugh
views such “major regulatory action[s]” as requiring clear congressional
authorization.121 Accordingly, he might be unlikely to defer to the SEC over

112

15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10).
See, e.g., Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *1–2 (“The Government,
meanwhile, asserts that the investments made in REcoin and Diamond were investment contracts and
thus securities . . . .” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
114
Brett M. Kavanaugh, The Courts and the Administrative State, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 711,
716 (2014) [hereinafter The Courts and the Administrative State].
115
See Fixing Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at 2137 (“I tend to be a judge who finds
clarity more readily than some of my colleagues but perhaps a little less readily than others. In practice,
I probably apply something approaching a 65-35 rule. In other words, if the interpretation is at least 65-35
clear, then I will call it clear and reject reliance on ambiguity-dependent canons.” (footnote omitted)).
116
CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 51.
117
Osipovich, supra note 3.
118
See infra Part III.A.
119
Hugh Son, JP Morgan Is Rolling Out the First US Bank-Backed Cryptocurrency to Transform
Payments Business, CNBC (Feb. 14, 2019, 5:59 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/13/jp-morgan-isrolling-out-the-first-us-bank-backed-cryptocurrency-to-transform-payments--.html.
120
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
121
Id.
113
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the question of whether it can regulate cryptocurrency. He might lead a
changed Supreme Court to do the same.
III. THE UNDESIRABILITY OF PIECEMEAL CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION
BY THE SEC
In an August 2018 interview with the Wall Street Journal, John L.
Hennessy—who chairs Alphabet Inc., Google’s parent company—said the
following in regards to technology regulation: “There’s a bigger role for
somebody to play here, whether it’s government or the nonprofit sector. The
challenge with government is, it tends to operate at a pace that is so slow. I
get nervous about government’s ability to legislate in fast-moving, deep
technology fields.”122 This type of skepticism—about whether the Federal
Government can keep up with innovations in the area of technology—bears
directly on the debate over whether the SEC should have a role in regulating
cryptocurrency. If the SEC is struggling to keep up with everchanging
technology, will allowing it to regulate ICOs—and cryptocurrency more
broadly—only lead to confusion and instability?
Before going further, it must be noted that, while skepticism of federal
agencies is not uncommon,123 there are strong arguments against such
skepticism. On the other side of the coin is the question of whether, by taking
cryptocurrency regulation out of the hands of the SEC, the Supreme Court
would effectively extinguish any chance that the Federal Government has to
keep up with the issue. In fact, rather than having the inability to keep up,
one criticism of federal agencies is that they can move entirely too fast.124
122
Douglas MacMillan, Alphabet’s Chairman on Government, China and Fake News, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 31, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/alphabets-chairman-on-government-chinaand-fake-news-1535720400.
123
See, e.g., Elizabeth Slattery, Who Will Regulate the Regulators? Administrative Agencies, the
Separation of Powers, and Chevron Deference, HERITAGE FOUND. (May 7, 2015),
https://www.heritage.org/courts/report/who-will-regulate-the-regulators-administrative-agencies-theseparation-powers-and#_ftn7 (criticizing federal agencies, using Justice Breyer’s statement that
“[a]gency decisions will also occasionally reflect ‘tunnel vision,’ an agency’s supreme confidence in the
importance of its own mission to the point where it leaves common sense aside” (quoting Stephen Breyer,
The Executive Branch, Administrative Action, and Comparative Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189,
2195 (2011))); Jonathan Turley, Opinion, The Rise of the Fourth Branch of Government, WASH. POST
(May
24,
2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-rise-of-the-fourth-branch-ofgovernment/2013/05/24/c7faaad0-c2ed-11e2-9fe2-6ee52d0eb7c1_story.html?utm_
term=.96bae49004cd (“Our carefully constructed system of checks and balances is being negated by the
rise of a fourth branch, an administrative state of sprawling departments and agencies that govern with
increasing autonomy and decreasing transparency.”).
124
Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., How Many Rules and Regulations Do Federal Agencies Issue?, FORBES
(Aug. 15, 2017, 12:48 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2017/08/15/how-many-rulesand-regulations-do-federal-agencies-issue/#10a2aa4e1e64 (“[I]ncreasingly, since the federal
government is so pervasive, it can regulate private activity without waiting for Congress to pass a law,
and without even going through the normal notice-and-comment rulemaking process to which agencies
‘must’ adhere. That threatens conservative and liberal values alike.”).
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From 1995 through 2016, federal agencies created 88,890 rules and
regulations, while Congress passed only 4312 public laws.125 With a
policymaking rate much greater than that of Congress, some would argue
that federal agencies like the SEC are best equipped to handle a quickly
developing issue like cryptocurrency regulation.
Another potential argument against curtailing the regulatory state in a
way that restricts the SEC’s power to regulate cryptocurrency is that such a
restriction would reject the guidance in Howey—a case upon which much of
the federal securities regulation jurisprudence is based.126 In Howey, the
Supreme Court stated that a security “embodies a flexible rather than a static
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the
promise of profits.”127 This interpretation has allowed the SEC wide latitude
to group a variety of devices into the definition of a “security” for more than
seventy years.128 Thus, to carve out cryptocurrency as one device that is not
a security could lead to instability in the law. Consequently, it could have
the opposite effect of one of the exclusion’s potential goals: creating a more
stable regulatory structure by only allowing the SEC to regulate the
securities that Congress clearly listed in the Securities Act and the Exchange
Act. The sudden shift in jurisprudence could cause an avalanche of lawsuits
challenging whether other devices are in fact securities under this new
precedent.
Furthermore, some might argue that forcing the SEC and federal
prosecutors to look to Congress for explicit authority to regulate
cryptocurrency is simply an exercise in procedure for the sake of procedure.
They might argue that asking Congress to add the word “cryptocurrency” to
the definitions for securities in the Exchange Act and the Securities Act
simply bogs down the Federal Government in procedure for no difference in
substance. The argument might be stated as: if Congress would surely add
the word, then why waste our time as cryptocurrency grows without proper
regulations? But this argument rests on two shaky assumptions. First, the
argument assumes without certainty that Congress would simply add
“cryptocurrency” to the list of items to be considered securities. Second, on
a broader public policy level, the argument assumes that Congress would
decide that securities regulations are the best way to regulate this field.
125

Id.
See, e.g., Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *20 (noting the “abundance of case
law interpreting and applying Howey at all levels of the judiciary”).
127
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946).
128
See Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *19–20 (noting that “courts are clear
that the securities laws are meant to be interpreted flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purpose” and
that “the test expounded in Howey has—for over 70 years—provided clear guidance to courts and
litigants as to the definition of investment contract under the securities laws” (alteration in original)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
126
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Perhaps, after hours of legislative hearing testimony and pages of legislative
research reports, Congress would decide that another regulatory structure,
such as one involving other banking regulators, would be best fit to regulate
cryptocurrency. Or, perhaps, Congress would decide that the unique nature
of cryptocurrency places it within an overlap of multiple existing regulatory
structures and thereby authorize the applicable federal agencies to take
charge. Or, to expand the spectrum of possibilities even further, perhaps
Congress would opt to craft a new regulatory structure altogether to deal
with this new and everchanging field.129
Despite the counterarguments discussed above, the SEC should not be
regulating cryptocurrency at this time. The arguments in this Section begin
with the basic premise that innovation is an asset to society. More
specifically, this Section is premised on the idea that innovation in the area
of cryptocurrency is generally positive and something that should be
encouraged. Some argue that innovation in financial instruments has led to
detrimental consequences, including the 2008 financial crisis.130 However,
innovation has brought to the economy automated teller machines, debit
cards, mutual funds, and venture capital funds, to name just a few financial
developments since the 1960s.131 Such innovations have had many positive
effects on the U.S. economy. They have revolutionized investing and the
way money moves throughout the United States and the world. Despite the
fact that developing financial instruments can be abused, their benefits
outweigh their potential risks. When innovation is unleashed and spreads
between companies and industries—a process called “diffusion”—the
process promotes economic growth.132
The innovation that provides the benefits discussed above does not occur
in a straight line. It is not always clear how innovators will change a product
or an industry. This is especially true for a rapidly developing, multi-faceted
subject like cryptocurrency. Because cryptocurrency development can occur
in a variety of ways, it inherently creates a certain amount of gray area. That
is to say that cryptocurrency can develop in both foreseen and unforeseen
ways that are not easily placed into the jurisdiction of any particular federal
agency. It is helpful to think of the current state of cryptocurrency and the
129
See Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing a Framework for Regulating
Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 495 (2015) (“We conclude that, in
addition to whatever ‘money services’ or ‘money transmission’ prudential regulation the States or federal
government may adopt, the operation of wallets and exchanges requires a new commercial law that lays
out rights and liabilities of cryptocurrency users in a robust and transparent fashion.”).
130
Douglas J. Elliott, Op-Ed: The Pros and Cons of Financial Innovation, BROOKINGS (Feb. 25,
2010), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/the-pros-and-cons-of-financial-innovation/.
131
Id.
132
Jason Douglas et al., The Problem with Innovation: The Biggest Companies Are Hogging All
the Gains, WALL ST. J. (July 15, 2018, 2:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-problem-withinnovation-the-biggest-companies-are-hogging-all-the-gains-1531680310.
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possibilities for cryptocurrency innovation as existing on a spectrum. On one
end, there is the group of cryptocurrencies that are simply used as a medium
of exchange, like Bitcoin. These are the cryptocurrencies that may more
closely resemble fiat currency or electronic payment systems and do not
appear to be securities.133 On the other end of the spectrum are ICOs that are
solely used as investment vehicles and seem the most like securities. In the
middle of the spectrum exist cryptocurrencies such as “utility tokens,” which
do not neatly fit into the categories at either end of the spectrum and may
not exhibit all of the traits necessary to meet the Howey test.134 With this
spectrum in mind, it appears that while some areas of cryptocurrency—such
as cryptocurrencies involving ICOs—might be appropriately suited for SEC
regulation, other forms of cryptocurrency are not. In fact, there may even be
aspects of cryptocurrencies involving ICOs that seem ill-suited for SEC
regulation. This gray area will continue to expand as cryptocurrency
continues to develop in a non-linear fashion. This leads to uncertainty for
cryptocurrency innovators. If these innovators could turn to a single
regulator as a sort of “one stop shop” for the regulations that they must
follow, the innovators could be more certain that they are complying with
all applicable rules. In addition, that regulator would be better suited to adapt
to the changing field of cryptocurrency than currently-existing federal
regulators because cryptocurrency would be the new regulator’s exclusive
focus.
With the benefits of innovation in mind, this Note expresses concern for
allowing the SEC to regulate cryptocurrency absent clearer congressional
authorization for three main reasons. First, cryptocurrency regulation is
developing into a major question because cryptocurrency is a subject of
immense innovation and a growing aspect of the U.S. economy. Next, the
SEC’s involvement could lead to an overall piecemeal approach to
cryptocurrency regulation on the part of the Federal Government. Finally, a
lack of certainty in regulation harms smaller innovators more than larger
innovators. Consequently, this Note argues that specific agencies like the
SEC should not assert authority over individual aspects of cryptocurrency
without clear congressional guidance. This Note further argues that, due to
the changing nature of cryptocurrency, mere coordination between federal
agencies will not provide sufficient clarity to cryptocurrency innovators.
Rather, Congress should authorize a new commission or sub-agency to
grapple with cryptocurrency issues as they arise and provide a “one stop
shop” to which cryptocurrency innovators can turn for regulatory guidance.

133
See Gerelyn Terzo, SEC: ICO Tokens Should Be Regulated as Securities, Not Bitcoin, YAHOO!
FIN.
(Apr.
27,
2018),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/sec-ico-tokens-regulated-securities205650102.html (“Bitcoin, [SEC] Chairman Clayton said, has ‘been determined by most people to not
be a security.’”).
134
Mendelson, supra note 14, at 78.
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A. Cryptocurrency Regulation as a Major Question
While federal agencies move quicker than Congress and while Howey
may set a precedent for some degree of flexibility in defining securities,
there is danger in allowing a federal agency to regulate a new technology on
the basis of authority that Congress delegated when it had never
contemplated such a technology. However quickly government agencies
may be able to move, technology moves faster.135 This is a multilayered
dilemma in the area of cryptocurrency. Individuals and institutions will
continue to invent uses for blockchain technology and cryptocurrency in
ways that are difficult to foresee.136 When Congress defined securities in the
1930s, not only had it not considered cryptocurrency and blockchain as we
know it today, but Congress also had not considered the myriad ways in
which these mechanisms will be used in the future.137 Such rapid innovation
requires carefully deliberated regulations. Without such deliberation, federal
agencies can be too quick to become involved in areas in which they do not
completely belong—both for lack of expertise and for lack of their
regulatory power’s applicability. Moreover, if courts read into federal law
SEC authorization to regulate cryptocurrency where it does not exist, they
fail to respect the “compromise” that Justice Kavanaugh described as
integral to the legislative process.138 Worse than this, they “tak[e] sides” in
a debate that should be left to the people’s representatives in Congress.139
The need for clear congressional direction will be evident with each
innovation that utilizes cryptocurrency in a new way. This will be especially
true as cryptocurrency becomes even more of a major component in the U.S.
economy. Thus, Justice Kavanaugh’s textualist approach correctly leads to
the conclusion that cryptocurrency regulation invokes the major questions
doctrine, and accordingly, courts should refuse to extend Chevron deference
to the SEC as the Commission regulates cryptocurrency without clear
guidance.140 Take, for example, J.P. Morgan Chase’s recent announcement
135
See MacMillan, supra note 122 (“The challenge with government is, it tends to operate at a pace
that is so slow. I get nervous about government’s ability to legislate in fast-moving, deep technology
fields.”).
136
See Mohit Kaushal & Sheel Tyle, The Blockchain: What It Is and Why It Matters, BROOKINGS:
TECHTANK (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2015/01/13/the-blockchain-whatit-is-and-why-it-matters/ (“The Blockchain is a foundational technology, like TCP/IP, which enables the
Internet. And much like the Internet in the late 1990s, we don’t know exactly how the Blockchain will
evolve, but evolve it will.”).
137
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 79b (Supp. 1935) (offering a definition of securities,
including items that could not be securities, in a draft resolution).
138
The Courts and the Administrative State, supra note 114, at 716.
139
Id. at 716–17.
140
See CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 54 (“[T]he FCC net neutrality rule, in Judge
Kavanaugh’s view, clearly qualified as a major rule for purposes of the major rules doctrine. . . . Because
Congress did not clearly authorize the FCC to promulgate the net neutrality rule, Judge Kavanaugh
ultimately concluded it was invalid.” (internal citations omitted)).
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of “JPM Coin.”141 This is a new, groundbreaking development that could
eventually lead to a vast increase in cryptocurrency’s use throughout the
world. JPM Coin is one of the first cryptocurrencies that a major U.S. bank
has crafted.142 According to J.P. Morgan, “a JPM Coin always has a value
equivalent to one U.S. dollar.”143 Additionally, the bank states that the
cryptocurrency is “redeemable in fiat currency held by J.P. Morgan (e.g.,
US$)” and is “designed to make instantaneous payments using blockchain
technology.”144 The bank plans to use JPM Coin “for international payments
for large corporate clients,” “for securities transactions,” and “for huge
corporations that use J.P. Morgan’s treasury services business to replace the
dollars they hold in subsidiaries across the world.”145
When a development like JPM Coin is viewed along with other uses of
cryptocurrency, such as the massive amounts of money that have been raised
through ICOs,146 it becomes clear that cryptocurrency regulation should be
deemed to have “major economic . . . significance.”147 JPM Coin is
essentially a fiat currency, even if just for an instant while two parties
execute a transaction. This cryptocurrency—and others like it—could have
a massive effect on the banking industry, which, similar to tobacco as
referenced in Brown & Williamson, is an “industry constituting a significant
portion of the American economy.”148 In 2016, the finance sector of the U.S.
economy consisted of twenty percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.149
Furthermore, J.P. Morgan could soon be using JPM Coin to help it move six
trillion dollars each day.150 Based on the large portion of the economy that
it could affect, cryptocurrency regulation should be deemed a major
question.
141

Son, supra note 119.
Id.; see also Benjamin Pirus, Signature Bank Beats JPMorgan to Ethereum-Based Token
Services, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/benjaminpirus/2019/02/22/
signature-bank-already-has-hundreds-of-clients-using-private-ethereum-jpm-coin-still-intesting/#51bf0d8d3359 (“JPMorgan Chase recently released a digital asset called JPM Coin, pegged to
the U.S. dollar, set for testing later in 2019. Misconceptions, however, included JPM Coin was the first
of its kind, when Signature Bank actually beat them to the punch.”).
143
J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25.
144
Id.
145
Son, supra note 119.
146
Osipovich, supra note 3 (noting that “$12 billion was raised in ICOs from January through the
end of June” of 2018).
147
CRS KAVANAUGH REPORT, supra note 20, at 51.
148
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000).
149
Christopher Witko, How Wall Street Became a Big Chunk of the U.S. Economy—and When the
Democrats Signed On, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE (Mar. 29, 2016, 12:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/03/29/how-wall-street-became-a-bigchunk-of-the-u-s-economy-and-when-the-democrats-signed-on/?utm_term=.9a240df524c8 (“Modern
economies depend on a thriving financial sector, and the U.S. finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE)
sector now accounts for 20 percent of GDP—compared with only 10 percent in 1947.”).
150
Son, supra note 119 (stating that J.P. Morgan Chase currently moves about six trillion dollars
per day).
142

343891-Connecticut_Law_52-2_Text.indd 485

7/28/20 10:49 AM

1014

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:2

Furthermore, how such a powerful tool like JPM Coin should be
regulated is a major issue for the U.S. economy because it has the potential
to revolutionize how transactions are completed within the United States and
internationally.151 When cryptocurrency is viewed with JPM Coin in mind,
the Supreme Court should “greet” the SEC’s “announcement” that it has the
power to regulate cryptocurrency based on the Securities and Exchange Acts
“with a measure of skepticism.”152 This was the protocol the Court expressed
in Utility Air Regulatory Group when an “agency claim[ed] to discover in a
long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate a significant portion of
the American economy.”153 Here, the SEC has found the power to regulate
cryptocurrency in statutory language from the 1930s.154 The SEC should not
be able to use less than explicit statutory language that has been in existence
since long before the inception of cryptocurrency to regulate an issue of such
profound importance and impact.155
It is important to note that Congress has already begun to propose ways
in which cryptocurrency should be regulated. In fact, four bills “focused on
investigating the criminal use of cryptocurrencies and improving
government agencies’ ability to address the problem” passed the U.S. House
of Representatives in 2018.156 Two bills related to the Department of
Homeland Security assessing the use of cryptocurrencies in terrorist acts.157
Another pertained to studying how cryptocurrencies are used in sex and drug
trafficking.158 Meanwhile, a fourth bill would allow the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN) to incorporate cryptocurrencies into its
anti-money laundering work.159 These bills demonstrate that there are a
variety of ways in which cryptocurrency might be addressed—and a variety
of ways in which Congress has contemplated doing so. But, in contrast to
151
Id. (“J.P. Morgan is preparing for a future in which parts of the essential underpinning of global
capitalism, from cross-border payments to corporate debt issuance, move to the blockchain.”).
152
Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
153
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
154
Colin Harper, “Guidance by Enforcement”: How the SEC Is Slowly Shaping ICO Regulation,
BITCOIN MAG. (Nov. 30, 2018), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/guidance-enforcement-how-secslowly-shaping-ico-regulation/.
155
See id. (“The foundation of the securities laws dates back to the 1930s, long before anyone could
have imagined the concept of a digital asset issued via the internet through the use of blockchain
technology. This old legal framework simply wasn’t designed for the digital age, and as a result, it doesn’t
provide the regulatory clarity that the crypto industry needs to move forward.” (quoting Jake Chervinsky,
an attorney at Kobre & Kim law firm)).
156
DAVID W. PERKINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45427, CRYPTOCURRENCY: THE ECONOMICS OF
MONEY AND SELECTED POLICY ISSUES 17 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45427.pdf.
157
Id. (citing Homeland Security Assessment of Terrorists Use of Virtual Currencies Act, H.R.
2433, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017) and Financial Technology Protection Act, H.R. 5036, 115th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2018)).
158
Id. (citing Fight Illicit Networks and Detect Trafficking Act, H.R. 6069, 115th Cong. (2d Sess.
2018)).
159
Id. (citing FinCEN Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 6411, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018)).
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the SEC’s attempts to regulate cryptocurrency without clear guidance, these
bills are examples of explicit guidance that Congress can provide to federal
agencies to address this major issue.
Without definitive guidance regarding cryptocurrency regulation,
federal agencies lack firm footing to regulate the field. This is a predictable
result—it is to be expected that a federal agency that was not designed to
address cryptocurrency would not be able to definitively stake a claim of
jurisdiction over the field as it develops at a rapid pace of technological
innovation. This lack of footing showed through when the SEC warned that
it was looking to exert its regulatory power over cryptocurrency. In its July
2017 Report of Investigation, the SEC “advise[d] those who would use a
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (‘DAO Entity’), or other
distributed ledger or blockchain-enabled means for capital raising, to take
appropriate steps to ensure compliance with the U.S. federal securities
laws.”160 Yet, the SEC issued the warning in such a way that did not promote
confidence that Congress had, in fact, provided a clear answer to the
question of whether the SEC had the authority to regulate such mechanisms.
The Commission stated that the Report was being disseminated “in order to
stress that the U.S. federal securities law may apply to various activities,
including distributed ledger technology, depending on the particular facts
and circumstances, without regard to the form of the organization or
technology used to effectuate a particular offer or sale.”161 Note that, in this
statement, the Commission did not definitively state that “securities laws do
apply” to cryptocurrency. Nor does this announced purpose of the Report
definitively indicate that Congress gave the Commission the authority to
regulate distributed ledger technology at all. Rather, the Commission must
qualify its purpose by noting that whether securities laws apply
“depend[s].”162
But a more deliberate approach—taken by Congress and aided by
legislative research and hearing testimony—could provide much clearer
guidance to empowered federal agencies regarding how to regulate
cryptocurrency. It would also recognize, in accord with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gottschalk, that there are “technological problems” for which
“considered action by the Congress is needed.”163 Congress is uniquely
suited to address cryptocurrency regulation because of its “broad powers of
investigation” that would allow it to “canvass the wide variety of views
which those operating in this field entertain.”164 This consideration would
allow empowered federal agencies—whether Congress decides to empower
160

July 2017 SEC Report of Investigation, supra note 12, at 1–2.
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
162
Id. at 10; see also Terzo, supra note 133 (noting that in a Congressional hearing, SEC Chairman
Jay Clayton described cryptocurrency as a “complicated area”).
163
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972).
164
Id.
161
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the SEC or a new federal agency or sub-agency as this Note proposes—to
confidently proceed into this area of regulation with the proper foundation
to fulfill the important function of preventing the use of cryptocurrency for
improper ends. When the SEC produces warnings and guidance in an area
of such importance without clear congressional guidance, it runs the risk of
losing legitimacy. As cryptocurrency technology develops, it exposes holes
in the SEC’s guidance that would better be filled through Congress’s
unequivocal statement about which agency should move forward into the
area of cryptocurrency.
With cryptocurrency becoming such a major, developing asset to the
U.S. economy, it should be viewed alongside regulatory subjects like
tobacco, telecommunications rate-filing requirements, and technological
developments in software. Notably, the Supreme Court has resisted federal
agency regulation of all of these subjects absent clear statutory authority
from Congress.165 Cryptocurrency should be no different. The SEC should
not be able to infer that it has the authority to regulate such a major issue
when no statute explicitly gives the Commission such authority. In addition,
judges should refrain from issuing rulings that allow the SEC to take such
authority, as such holdings fly in the face of the Separation of Powers, which
directs the Congress in conjunction with the President to make the laws.166
B. Guarding Against a Piecemeal Approach to Cryptocurrency Regulation
Allowing federal agencies to regulate cryptocurrency without clear
statutory authority could lead to a piecemeal approach to cryptocurrency
regulation that does not fully account for all of its uses. Of course, the
cryptocurrency industry would not be the first field to be regulated by
multiple agencies. For example, agencies that regulate the food industry
include the Food and Drug Administration, Food Safety Inspection Service,
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Environmental Protection
Agency, United States Department of Agriculture, Federal Trade
Commission, Department of Commerce, and Department of Labor, among
other state and federal regulatory bodies.167 Any multifaceted industry will
be subject to a variety of regulators. This Section does not argue that any
company or industry that engages in the cryptocurrency field should not be
subject to the various applicable regulators. For example, this Note does not
165
U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 420–21 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted).
166
See Fixing Statutory Interpretation, supra note 21, at 2120 (“Article I assigns Congress, along
with the President, the power to make laws. Article III grants the courts the ‘judicial Power’ to interpret
those laws in individual ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’ When courts apply doctrines that allow them to
rewrite the laws (in effect), they are encroaching on the legislature’s Article I power.” (footnotes
omitted)).
167
US Agencies Involved with Food Safety, N.D. ST. U., https://www.ndsu.edu/pubweb/~saxowsky/
aglawtextbk/chapters/foodlaw/USagencies.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
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argue that if a major bank creates a cryptocurrency, then that bank should no
longer have to comply with the various federal banking regulators. Rather,
this Section argues for single agency regulation—a “one stop shop”—of
cryptocurrency regulation, specifically.
A comparison to, for example, the food industry provides a useful
juxtaposition. The food industry is much more mature than the
cryptocurrency field. While innovations are constantly taking place, even in
mature fields like the food industry, food production generally is, of course,
not a new subject for regulation. Piecemeal regulation does not endanger
food production, as a whole, in the same way it endangers a new, developing
technology like cryptocurrency. While companies that take part in the food
industry may argue that they must deal with too many regulators—and
smaller companies in that industry might claim that they are
disproportionately affected by the cost of compliance of engaging the
multitude of regulators—there is inherently more regulatory clarity for
mature industries, at least in general. This is the product of mature industries
having been regulated for so long. Cryptocurrency is different.
Cryptocurrency is new and developing. Unfortunately, “with little official
guidance to go on, startups are left to fend for themselves in a sea of selfdeclared experts.”168
While securities regulations might practically be used for some
cryptocurrency regulation, securities laws are not applicable to all forms of
cryptocurrency. 169 This point is illustrated by the striking differences
between JPM Coin and the cryptocurrencies at issue in Zaslavskiy.170 On the
one hand, Zaslavskiy allegedly defrauded investors through
misrepresentations that his coins were “backed by investments in real estate
and diamonds” when, in fact, they were not.171 Furthermore, Zaslavskiy
staged an initial coin offering and lied to investors about both how much he
had raised and a supposed “team of lawyers, professionals, brokers, and
accountants.”172 On the other hand, J.P. Morgan—a vast and established
institution173—is promoting a form of cryptocurrency that is “redeemable in
168

Mendelson, supra note 14, at 52.
See Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 129, at 528–29 (“[A]lthough it is highly desirable for
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to continue to regulate and supervise those who would
offer securities based on cryptocurrencies, . . . any role played by securities regulators, including the
SEC, would not resolve all of the issues involved with the use of cryptocurrencies in payment
transactions.” (footnote omitted)).
170
See Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *2–3 (discussing the defendant’s alleged
fraudulent scheme involving cryptocurrencies).
171
SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin Offerings Purportedly Backed by Real Estate and Diamonds,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-185-0
[hereinafter SEC Zaslavskiy Press Release].
172
Id.
173
Son, supra note 119 (“The lender moves more than $6 trillion around the world every day for
corporations in its massive wholesale payments business.”).
169
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fiat currency held by J.P. Morgan” and corresponds in value with the U.S.
dollar.174 To reiterate, JPM Coin will reportedly be used for purposes
including “international payments for large corporate clients” and
“securities transactions,” as well as “for huge corporations that use J.P.
Morgan’s treasury services business to replace the dollars they hold in
subsidiaries across the world.”175 These differences between JPM Coin and
the Zaslavskiy cryptocurrencies raise the question of whether
cryptocurrencies that are so different can be sensibly regulated in the same
way. Furthermore, if the answer is no, how should the regulatory structures
for different types of cryptocurrency be constructed?
J.P. Morgan provides some insights regarding the complexity of these
regulatory questions. In announcing its new cryptocurrency, the bank touts
the fact that it is “a nationally chartered U.S. bank” that “must comply with
banking laws and regulations.”176 J.P. Morgan further touts that it is
“supervised by banking regulators in the United States and in the
international jurisdictions in which it operates.”177 According to the bank,
this “[r]egulatory [o]versight,” combined with other factors such as its
“expertise in blockchain,” allow it to “seamlessly and securely transfer and
settle money for clients around the world.”178 J.P. Morgan is wise to tout this
regulatory structure, as it helps to portray JPM Coin as less risky than other
cryptocurrencies.179 As to the question of whether regulators support JPM
Coin, J.P. Morgan responds, “JPM Coin is currently a prototype. As we
move towards production we will actively engage our regulators to explain
its design and solicit their feedback and any necessary approvals.”180 With
this in mind, the following questions remain: Should these regulators include
the SEC? Is JPM Coin truly a security? Should the SEC regulate JPM Coin
in the same way that it regulated Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies?
By proposing that courts guard against the piecemeal regulation of
cryptocurrency, this Note does not intend to allow frauds and other crimes
involving cryptocurrency to go unregulated. Accordingly, before moving
any further, this Note will separate Zaslavskiy’s alleged fraud from the
broader question of the use of securities regulations to regulate
cryptocurrency. This separation is important to avoid the appearance that by
174

J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25.
Son, supra note 119.
176
J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
See, e.g., Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 129, at 528 (“Online wallet operators and
exchanges in the cryptocurrency industry do not have comparable regulatory requirements and, as a
result, their customers are exposed to higher credit and liquidity risks of cryptocurrency wallets and
exchanges than are customers of traditional money service businesses or money transmitters or
depository institutions.”).
180
J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25.
175
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refusing to classify cryptocurrency as a security, courts would allow alleged
fraudsters like Zaslavskiy to avoid accountability for their actions. A finding
that cryptocurrency does not fall within the definition of a security would
not have left the state and federal governments without a remedy through
which it could have prosecuted Zaslavskiy for his fraud—a fraud that it
seems clear he committed if the allegations against him are true.181 For
example, as long as such a fraud involved interstate wire transmittals or the
mail, the Federal Government likely could have prosecuted Zaslavskiy for
wire fraud182 or mail fraud.183 This means that, under such circumstances,
the Federal Government could have charged Zaslavskiy with or without the
SEC and with or without relying on a court to define his cryptocurrencies as
securities. Note that the mail fraud statute includes using the mail in
connection with fraudulently “sell[ing]” and “exchang[ing] . . . any
counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article.”184
Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies could have fallen within such language,
which includes securities, but covers a far more expansive landscape than
just securities. These general fraud statutes would have been the proper
avenue for prosecution in such a case lacking clarity as to whether
cryptocurrencies are securities. In contrast to these more general fraud
statutes, the Supreme Court has noted “that Congress, in enacting the
securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all
fraud.”185 But, by defining Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies as securities, the
Federal Government gained access to more prosecutorial tools. By way of

181
See McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 893 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Fraud is a generic term, which
embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise and which are resorted to by one
individual to gain an advantage over another by false suggestions or by the suppression of truth. No
definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud, and it includes all
surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and any unfair way by which another is cheated.” (citing Stapleton
v. Holt, 250 P.2d 451, 453–54 (Okla. 1952))).
182
See 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses,
representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication in interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds for the
purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both.”).
183
See id. § 1341 (prescribing punishment for “[w]hoever, having devised or intending to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute,
supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or
other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious
article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by
the Postal Service” (emphasis added)).
184
Id.
185
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (citations omitted).
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the SEC, the Federal Government also charged Zaslavskiy with violating the
“registration provisions of the federal securities laws.”186
If Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies should have been filed as securities, it
is important to ask whether that means that all cryptocurrencies, including
JPM Coin, should be registered as securities. For purposes of this Note’s
analysis, it is helpful to first hypothetically attempt to bring a
cryptocurrency, like JPM Coin, under the purview of securities laws in the
same way that the Federal Government brought Zaslavskiy’s
cryptocurrencies under such regulation: by defining the cryptocurrency as
an investment contract. Such an analysis seems appropriate because this is
the only way that the Federal Government has, thus far, been able to subject
cryptocurrency to securities laws. This Note argues that it would be difficult
for the Federal Government, under such an analysis, to successfully define
JPM Coin as a security. As this Note previously stated, the three
requirements for an “investment contract” under the Howey test are: (1) an
investment of money (2) in a “common enterprise” in which someone (3) “is
led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or third party.”187
Without even examining the first two requirements, it appears as though the
Federal Government would fail on the third prong of the Howey test alone.
If JPM Coin is simply being used for instant transactions, it seems clear that
those who use it are not being “led to expect profits solely from the efforts
of . . . [a] third party.”188 From this standpoint, it seems as though the
following is true: the Zaslavskiy cryptocurrencies may have been deemed
securities by way of their characterization as investment contracts; but, the
closest association that JPM Coin should have to the securities regulatory
scheme is that one of its key purposes will reportedly be “instant
settlements” in “securities transactions.”189
Some might submit that the distinguishing factor between the Zaslavskiy
cryptocurrencies and JPM Coin is so simple that proposing that regulators
might try to classify JPM Coin as an investment contract is simply setting
up a strawman argument that can be easily struck down. The obvious
distinction is that the Zaslavskiy cryptocurrencies involved an initial coin
offering that was used to raise capital,190 while JPM Coin presumably will
not. In fact, it may seem that JPM Coin is so different from Zaslavskiy-like
cryptocurrencies that JPM Coin can easily be viewed as a payment system,
and as a result, there is no reason to grapple over whether it is a security. In
this sense, JPM Coin would seem more like the Automated Clearing House
186

SEC Zaslavskiy Press Release, supra note 171.
Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *9 (internal citation omitted); see supra Part
I (describing the Howey test as applied in the Zaslavskiy case).
188
Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *9.
189
Son, supra note 119.
190
SEC Zaslavskiy Press Release, supra note 171.
187
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(ACH) system, which clears and settles electronic fund transfers.191 Or, it
may seem more like the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial
Telecommunications (SWIFT), through which “advice or an instruction for
a bank to transfer funds from one account to another” can be sent.192
Therefore, one might observe that the Zaslavskiy cryptocurrencies fall neatly
within the purview of securities regulation, while JPM Coin falls wholly
without.193 At first, this observation seems to be a useful tool to aid in the
argument that federal regulators need no more guidance from Congress in
order to proceed with regulating cryptocurrency. Proponents of this view
might argue that Congress so clearly intended for Zaslavskiy
cryptocurrencies—and not JPM Coin—to be subject to securities regulation,
that looking to Congress for more explicit authorization regarding how to
regulate cryptocurrency is wasting time on procedure for the sake of
procedure.
One might further submit that it is plain to see that JPM Coin should not
fall under the purview of securities regulations because it is much more like
an actual form of currency or fiat money than it is a security. J.P. Morgan is
not merely holding investors’ money and promising return on their
investments in cryptocurrency. Rather, as the bank describes, “[w]hen one
client sends money to another over the blockchain, JPM Coins are
transferred and instantaneously redeemed for the equivalent amount of U.S.
dollars.”194 Thus, some might argue that when JPM Coin is placed before
any judge, it will be easy for the judge to decide that it is definitively not a
security.
But careful attention to Judge Dearie’s memorandum and order in
Zaslavskiy undermines this argument. There, the court acknowledged—and
swiftly dismissed—the defendant’s “glib[]” argument that investors did not
invest money because they “exchange[d]” “one medium of currency for
another.”195 Judge Dearie noted that the “Indictment alleges that investors
gave up money—or other assets—in exchange for ‘membership’ in [the

191
Don Coker, Banking Industry Standards and Practices for Funds Wire Transfers by Fed Wire,
CHIPS, SWIFT, ACH, and EFT, HGEXPERTS.COM, https://www.hgexperts.com/expert-witnessarticles/banking-industry-standards-and-practices-for-funds-wire-transfers-by-fed-wire-chips-swiftach-and-eft-20495 (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
192
Id. As a preliminary matter, these comparisons to cryptocurrency are not entirely warranted, as
cryptocurrency differs from both the SWIFT and ACH systems because those systems are not
traditionally based on blockchain technology. See id. (describing the SWIFT and ACH systems).
193
See Terzo, supra note 133 (“Bitcoin, [SEC] Chairman Clayton said, has ‘been determined by
most people to not be a security.’ Tokens used to finance projects, such as tokens that are issued in the
fundraising process of an ICO, however, are different. ‘There are none that I’ve seen that aren’t
securities,’ said Clayton,” [sic] adding: ‘To the extent something is a security, we should regulate it as a
security.’”).
194
J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25.
195
Zaslavskiy Memorandum & Order, supra note 3, at *11 (quoting defendant’s motion to dismiss).
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defendant’s] ventures.”196 With this precedent on the record, it is uncertain
whether judges will be apt to simply recognize a cryptocurrency as akin to a
currency and dismiss its status as a potential security.
Importantly, to make either of the arguments in the last two paragraphs
for classifying Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrency as a security—and J.P.
Morgan’s cryptocurrency as something else—defeats another potential
non-textualist argument that this Note acknowledged when it first discussed
“procedure for the sake of procedure.”197 That argument was that it would
be a waste of time to ask Congress to add the word “cryptocurrency” to the
definitions for securities in the Exchange Act and the Securities Act because
it goes without saying that the definitions already provide the authority to
regulate cryptocurrencies as securities.198 Simply put, drawing a line
between Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies and JPM Coin in order to distinguish
what is a security and what is not acknowledges that the SEC does not have
blanket authority to regulate cryptocurrencies. After all, both tokens are
cryptocurrencies, and such a distinction would place one of them outside the
purview of securities regulations.
In short, the SEC’s role in cryptocurrency regulation post-Zaslavskiy
could go either of two ways—but both are undesirable. The first possibility
is that the SEC will not claim jurisdiction over all cryptocurrencies because
it will concede that it does not have clear authority to do so. This would leave
cryptocurrency innovators with the question of whether their specific
cryptocurrency obliges them to follow the SEC’s requirements, including
those on registration. The second possibility is that the SEC will claim
jurisdiction over all cryptocurrency. In this case, the Commission would be
regulating cryptocurrencies that do not appropriately fit under its authority,
including cryptocurrencies that do not involve ICOs.199 Either way,
innovation suffers.
If Congress were to authorize one agency or sub-agency to deal with
cryptocurrency regulation, that regulatory body could appropriately deal
with the full spectrum of cryptocurrencies—from those like JPM Coin,
which look like fiat currency, to those like Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies,
which looked much more like securities. With such a system in place,
196

Id.
See supra Part III.
198
Id.
199
But, even distinguishing cryptocurrencies involving ICOs from other cryptocurrencies would
not necessarily resolve the issue of determining the proper place for SEC regulation, as there is room for
disagreement regarding whether all ICO-related cryptocurrencies are securities. See Diego Zuluaga,
Should Cryptocurrencies Be Regulated Like Securities?, CATO INST. BRIEFING PAPER, June 25, 2018, at
3, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/cmfa-briefing-paper-1-updated.pdf (“[S]ome ICOs
may qualify as securities under certain circumstances.” (emphasis added)); see also Clayton, supra note
4 (“A key question for all ICO market participants: ‘Is the coin or token a security?’ As securities law
practitioners know well, the answer depends on the facts.”).
197
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Congress could direct the regulatory body to conduct analyses that properly
address these two types of cryptocurrencies and those that fall in the gray
area in between. It would not be out of the ordinary for Congress to direct
such analyses.200 In accord with this Note’s argument describing
cryptocurrency as a major question,201 the role of Congress is important in
avoiding piecemeal regulation because cryptocurrency raises “problems . . .
which only committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of
investigation are needed.”202 Such problems would be best dealt with by
Congress and an agency it specifically authorizes.
A full discussion of exactly which agency should house a potential
cryptocurrency sub-agency is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the
missions and characteristics of certain currently-existing federal agencies
offer some guidance. First, while the SEC is not currently positioned to
adequately address cryptocurrency, with clear congressional guidance, the
SEC might ultimately be the best agency to house a cryptocurrency
sub-agency. The SEC’s mission is “to protect investors; maintain fair,
orderly, and efficient markets; and facilitate capital formation.”203 As such,
the SEC could provide some expertise in the areas of: (a) cryptocurrencies
that involve capital raising; and (b) the markets in which cryptocurrencies
are exchanged. However, adequately equipping the SEC to deal with
cryptocurrency would involve expanding its authority within the new
sub-agency so that it can address and adapt to non-capital raising
cryptocurrencies that currently exist or are yet to be developed.
The Federal Trade Commission might serve as an even better host to a
new cryptocurrency sub-agency due to its more general mission. The FTC
seeks to “[p]rotect[] consumers and competition by preventing
anticompetitive, deceptive, and unfair business practices through law
enforcement, advocacy, and education without unduly burdening legitimate
business activity.”204 As the Zaslavskiy case demonstrates, there are
200
See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, 2017 DRAFT
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND AGENCY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 1
n.2
(2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/draft_2017_cost_benefit_report.pdf (“Under
the [Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996], agencies submit a report to each
House of Congress and GAO and make available ‘a complete copy of the cost-benefit analysis of the
rule, if any.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012))).
201
See supra Section III.A.
202
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972); see also Harper, supra note 154 (“The crypto
industry won’t have a firm standard for what conduct is allowed and what’s illegal until Congress passes
new legislation or the SEC’s theories are tested in court.” (quoting Jake Chervinsky, an attorney at Kobre
& Kim law firm)).
203
About the SEC, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/about.shtml (last visited
Oct. 2, 2019).
204
About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last visited Oct. 2, 2019).
See also What to Know About Cryptocurrency, FED. TRADE COMM’N CONSUMER INFO. (Oct. 2018),
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certainly “deceptive” and “unfair” business practices to be addressed in the
world of cryptocurrency.205 But, as a broader concept, these issues
presumably do not all involve the types of cryptocurrencies that look like
securities. As such, the FTC might be better equipped than the SEC to deal
with the broad range of fraud and abuse that can occur in the developing
field of cryptocurrency. On the other hand, the FTC presents the question of
whether the Federal Government will want to view all of those who purchase
cryptocurrencies as simply “consumers” rather than “investors.”
As this overview of the SEC and the FTC illustrates, there may not exist
any perfect host for a new cryptocurrency sub-agency. As such, Congress
may find it best to create a separate, freestanding commission to deal with
cryptocurrency. But regardless of whether Congress decides to modify the
authority of a currently-existing federal agency through the formation of a
sub-agency or to create a new federal commission altogether, either option
would be preferable to the current state of affairs. Appropriate, clear
congressional guidance would lead to the formation of a body that is
adequately equipped to deal with the full range of cryptocurrency
innovations as they develop.
C. The Disproportionate Effect of Uncertainty in Regulation on Smaller
Cryptocurrency Innovators
Many will argue that some cryptocurrency regulation—even if
piecemeal—is better than no regulation. This Note does not dispute that
point. For example, protecting Americans from fraudsters and investor
scams, such as the fraud alleged in Zaslavskiy, is an important role of the
Federal Government. That role should not be disregarded in a specific case
simply because cryptocurrency is involved. Whether or not fraudsters should
be prosecuted is not a close question. But, upon deeper inspection, the
relevant questions become much closer. One close question is whether
cryptocurrency fraudsters should be charged with securities fraud or under
some other anti-fraud provision. Put another way, should the Federal
Government be afforded an additional ground for federal jurisdiction
through the anti-securities fraud statutory remedy? Or, as an alternative,
should the Federal Government have to rely on other more general anti-fraud
statutes or simply concede that some fraud fighting should be left to the
States? An even closer question involves whether, setting aside this
discussion of fraud altogether, cryptocurrencies should have to be registered
as securities—and if so, which cryptocurrencies should have to be
registered?
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/what-know-about-cryptocurrency (providing information to
consumers about cryptocurrency and cryptocurrency scams).
205
See supra Part I for a discussion of Zaslavskiy.
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The fact is that the answers to the questions noted above are not clear.
Rather, due to the SEC’s own lack of specification, it is “impossible to tell
which” cryptocurrencies the SEC considers to be securities and which ones
it does not.206 A negative consequence of the lack of clarity regarding these
questions is that action can be brought against individuals and
cryptocurrency corporations for failing to register a cryptocurrency with the
SEC, even though there was no clear notice that such a cryptocurrency
should have been registered in the first place.207 This lack of notice leads to
injustice. Moreover, the development of cryptocurrency as an asset to our
society can be stifled through this lack of clarity.208 One corporation has
already blamed the “ever changing regulatory landscape of the
cryptocurrency space” as the reason that it shut down.209
But, importantly, all corporations are not affected equally by uncertainty
in regulation. Smaller companies, like the aforementioned company that
claimed that it shut down due to constantly changing regulations,210 can
withstand much less regulatory scrutiny and fewer penalties than larger
corporations, like J.P. Morgan. In that connection, smaller cryptocurrency
companies can afford to take on less risk than larger companies. With its
vast resources, J.P. Morgan is much more likely to be able to “actively
engage [its] regulators to explain its [cryptocurrency’s] design and solicit
their feedback and any necessary approvals,”211 than a smaller company.
Consequently, as regulatory uncertainty persists, smaller companies will be
less likely to innovate and thereby take the chance that the SEC or some
other agency will sanction them for an infraction as simple as failing to
register their cryptocurrency as a security.
The idea that smaller corporations can be at a disadvantage in the area
of innovation is not a novel one. In general, economists worry that smaller
companies are not enjoying the rewards of innovation that larger companies
206

Michaels, supra note 1.
See, e.g., Solias v. Latium Network, Inc., No. 18-10255 (SDW) (SCM), 2018 WL 6445543, at
*6 (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2018) (“[T]his Court concludes that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that LATX
tokens are investment contracts under the Howey test. Because the LATX were never registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Plaintiff may maintain a cause of action against Latium . . . .”
(internal citations omitted)).
208
See Zuluaga, supra note 199, at 1 (“Regulatory uncertainty is chilling innovation and increasing
volatility in cryptocurrency markets.”); see also Kaushal & Tyle, supra note 136 (“Disruptive
technologies rarely fit neatly into existing regulatory considerations, but rigid regulatory frameworks
have repeatedly stifled innovation. It’s likely that innovations in the Blockchain will outpace policy, let’s
not slow it down.”); Alex Sunnarborg, The Incoming Wave of ICO Regulation (Yes, It’s Coming),
COINDESK (Nov. 2, 2018, 8:00 UTC), https://www.coindesk.com/the-incoming-wave-of-ico-regulationyes-its-coming (last updated Nov. 3, 2018) (“Aside from the uncertain regulatory risk, an ICO is nearly
a no-brainer for capital hungry entrepreneurs.”).
209
Michaels, supra note 1.
210
Id.
211
J.P. Morgan JPM Coin Announcement, supra note 25.
207
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enjoy.212 Unfortunately, “globalization and new technology [are] delivering
outsize rewards to the titans of the global economy.”213 Even without the
adverse effects of unclear regulations, innovations may already be too
expensive for smaller companies to undertake.214 This general hazard applies
to the cryptocurrency landscape, where larger corporations can foot the bill
for innovation, while smaller companies may have to wait for innovations
to trickle down to them. But even if the “trickle down” were immediate, this
dilemma creates a secondary issue because smaller corporations may not be
interested in the innovations of larger corporations at all. For example, a
small company may not have any use for a fiat-like currency like JPM Coin,
but it may find great utility in an ICO. The reverse may also be true, as J.P.
Morgan may have no interest in an ICO that a smaller company would
utilize. The danger that results is that only innovations that benefit larger
cryptocurrency corporations will be brought to fruition, while the
innovations that might benefit smaller companies lag behind. Uncertainty in
regulation only serves to exacerbate this inequality.
If cryptocurrency innovators were able to engage one regulator—in the
form of a single cryptocurrency regulatory body—the problem of inequality
between smaller and larger companies would be diminished. Rather than
guessing as to which agencies will regulate their cryptocurrency, the
companies could look to just one commission for regulatory guidance. Such
an agency could give those companies confidence as they innovate. For
example, the body could provide clear regulations depending on the type of
cryptocurrency the company promotes. Additionally, while innovating, a
cryptocurrency company could ask the regulator directly whether it would
take action against the company for taking certain steps. Hypothetically, the
regulator could then issue a “no-action letter” in order to indicate that the
company would not be subject to enforcement. The SEC currently issues noaction letters in response to “individual[s] or entit[ies] who [are] not certain
whether a particular product, service, or action would constitute a violation
of federal securities law.”215 While these letters can give confidence to those
concerned only about an SEC enforcement action, their usefulness is
lessened when innovators do not know exactly which agencies will be
regulating them. This is the case with cryptocurrency regulation. Smaller
companies simply may not have the resources to reach out to multiple
212

Douglas et al., supra note 132.
Id.
214
Id. (“By developing the technology itself, [PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP] reaps all the
productivity gains. Abacus Consulting has access to a similar tool, but it has to pay another software
company to use it, reducing its productivity gain. Building the software ‘wouldn’t be viable for a small
business like mine, as the costs would be too high for development and we wouldn’t be able to offer the
same security as larger providers can,’ says Mr. Pritchard [a manager at Abacus Consultancy].”).
215
No Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fastanswers/answersnoactionhtm.html (last modified Mar. 23, 2017).
213
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potential regulators and inquire as to their regulatory obligations. The
consequent inability to move forward with confidence that an unforeseen
sanction will not force a small company to shut down might lead that
company to forgo certain avenues of innovation altogether.
There is a legitimate argument that the proposal in this Note will add an
agency (or sub-agency) to the Federal Government that is capable of being
controlled by the lobbyists of large corporations.216 That argument would
lead to the conclusion that the proposal would not resolve the issue of
disproportionate impacts on large and small cryptocurrency companies
because the large corporations would lobby for regulations that benefit them.
This Note acknowledges this argument and does not dismiss it. However,
when viewed alongside the alternatives—and the current state of affairs—
an agency committed to getting comprehensive cryptocurrency regulation
right is superior to a multitude of agencies that claim jurisdiction over the
subject without sending clear messages to those they regulate. In fact, if
there is any way that smaller cryptocurrency companies can have their
voices heard, it would be through Congress or a single accessible regulator
that has been directed by Congress to account for all of the players in the
cryptocurrency economy. After all, it is Congress that can conduct “hearings
which canvass the wide variety of views which those operating in this field
entertain.”217 As this Note has argued, when cryptocurrency companies must
engage multiple regulators that might have jurisdiction over them, the
smallest companies with the least resources are hurt the most and heard the
least.
A related counterargument to this Note’s proposal states that if a goal of
this proposal is to encourage innovation, then initiating a new regulatory
body to regulate cryptocurrency is counterintuitive because it will lead to
more regulation, which actually holds back innovation.218 This, too, is a
legitimate argument. However, what is worse for innovation than a “rigid
regulatory framework[]”219 is an amorphous, uncertain regulatory
framework. Under the latter, companies and individuals are left with options
that include (1) taking their chances and assuming massive risk as they guess
which agencies might regulate them; (2) hedging against regulatory sanction
by engaging as many government entities as possible; and (3) forgoing the
risk of innovation altogether. Large cryptocurrency entities may have the
216
See Tim Carney, Big Business and Big Government, CATO INST. (July 1, 2006),
https://www.cato.org/policy-report/julyaugust-2006/big-business-big-government (“[F]or the past
century and more big business has often relied on big government for support.”).
217
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 73 (1972).
218
See Kaushal & Tyle, supra note 136 (“Had we over-regulated the Internet early on, we would
have missed out on many innovations that we can’t imagine living without today. The same is true for
the Blockchain. Disruptive technologies rarely fit neatly into existing regulatory considerations, but rigid
regulatory frameworks have repeatedly stifled innovation. It’s likely that innovations in the Blockchain
will outpace policy, let’s not slow it down.”).
219
Id.
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resources to choose options (1) or (2), while smaller entities are much more
likely to have to choose option (3). The Federal Government of the United
States should strive for a better regulatory framework than this system, in
which innovators must decide whether the uncertainty in regulation creates
a risk too great to bear.
CONCLUSION
The SEC has been successful in convincing at least one judge at the
federal district court level that cryptocurrencies can qualify as securities.
Yet, Congress has not provided explicit guidance regarding how
cryptocurrency should be classified, which agencies should regulate it, and
what types of cryptocurrencies each agency should oversee. New uses for
blockchain technology continue to be developed without firm guidance
regarding whether these new cryptocurrencies need to be registered as
securities. When the next use of blockchain technology is invented, it is
unclear where it will fall on the continuum that contains at one end a
supposed warrant for securities regulations (i.e. cryptocurrencies involving
ICOs, such as Zaslavskiy’s cryptocurrencies) and on the other end perhaps
no warrant for SEC regulation at all (i.e. fiat-like cryptocurrencies, such as
JPM Coin). It is also unclear whether the SEC will be able to charge whoever
puts this new cryptocurrency into use with “violations of the . . . registration
provisions of the federal securities laws”220 if they have not registered the
cryptocurrency with the Commission. This Note has argued that the SEC
needs firmer statutory ground to stand on before it can subject anyone to
such liability. This Note has further argued that a new federal agency or
sub-agency that specifically deals with cryptocurrency would best address
the complex issues that cryptocurrency regulation presents. Rather than
allowing piecemeal regulation through agencies acting without clear
congressional authorization, such a solution would provide a focused “one
stop shop” for cryptocurrency innovators that is capable of adapting to meet
the regulatory needs of cryptocurrency development.

220

SEC Zaslavskiy Press Release, supra note 171.
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